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ANOTHER CASE FOR THE REMOVAL OF FLORIDA'S
MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURER-DEALER
FRANCHISE TRADE REGULATION FROM PERIODIC
SUNSET REVIEW-A COMMENT ON BALZER
WILLIAM OWEN*
T HE PURPOSE of this Article is to present reasons for the re-
moval of Florida's motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer franchise
trade regulation' from periodic review pursuant to the Regulatory
Sunset Act. 2 Several considerations favoring removal of this trade reg-
ulation from the operation of the sunset process are examined. It
should be noted at the outset that this commentator agrees with the
ultimate conclusion reached by author Barbara Balzer.3 However, Bal-
zer premises her conclusion that automobile franchise regulation
should be exempt from sunset review upon a basic misconception re-
garding the purpose and the ultimate effect of the franchise legisla-
tion, with the result that she disparages the ability of the Legislature
to react realistically and critically within the sunset review process it-
self.
Balzer suggests that the Legislature's failure to accept and enforce
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Committee
staff 4 regarding the merits of the trade regulation under sunset review
*Shareholder, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler & Kent, P.A. B.A.,
1964, University of Florida; J.D., 1967, University of Nebraska. Carlton, Fields represents the
Florida Automobile Dealers Association, a trade association composed of over 800 Florida fran-
chised motor vehicle dealers.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.60-.70 (1987).
2. Id. § 11.61.
3. Balzer, The Fragility of Good Ideas: A Case for Abolishing Sunset Review of Florida's
Motor Vehicle Manufacturer Licensing Statute, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 697 (1988) [hereinafter
Balzer].
4. Balzer served as an analyst on the Senate Economic, Community and Consumer Affairs
Committee's (ECCA) Staff which compiled a sunset report on the law for the Senate. Nothing
published or adopted by the House Regulatory Reform staff suggests that it had developed the
same "mind set" voiced by the ECCA staff. Compare STAFF OF FLA. H.R. COMM. ON REG.
REFORM, 1988 SUNSET AND SUNDOWN REPORT, VOL. I (July 1988) [hereinafter 1988 SUNSET AND
SUNDOWN REPORT] (on file with committee) with STAFF OF FLA. S. EcoN., COMM'Y & CONS.
AFFAIRS, A REVIEW OF SECTIONS 320.27-.31, FLORIDA STATUTES, RELATING TO MOTOR VEHICLE
MANUFACTURERS, FACTORY BRANCHES, DISTRIBUTORS AND IMPORTERS (Apr. 1988) (on file with
committee). In fact, the House staff report states:
It is concluded that the regulation of motor vehicle dealers, manufacturers, importers
and distributors is necessary for the protection of the economic welfare of the citizens
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was contrary to the function of the legislative sunset process in gen-
eral. Based upon her view that the franchise regulation is not "neces-
sary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare from significant
and discernible harm or damage" 5 she concluded that the law would
not have been reenacted if the regulation had actually been subjected
to meaningful sunset review by the Legislature. So long as the Legisla-
ture refuses to perform its sunset function properly, argues Balzer,
removal of the regulatory scheme from periodic review under the sun-
set process would actually serve the public interest because it would
deprive the dealer lobby of the opportunity to revise the applicable
laws to the advantage of its members, and against the interests of au-
tomobile manufacturers and the consuming public generally. 6
A beginning point for a meaningful critique of the significance of
the franchise regulatory scheme is to examine why Florida, like the
overwhelming majority of other states, has chosen to enact and up-
date its existing laws governing the relationship between automobile
manufacturers and dealers.7
In the early days of the franchise system, while dealers aspired, and
perhaps even imagined themselves to be independent businessmen,8
they were in fact completely dominated by the vastly superior eco-
nomic power of their respective manufacturers. 9 The early contracts
between manufacturers and dealers were "contracts of adhesion.'" 0
Nonetheless, courts were curiously reluctant to impose conditions of
"good faith" or "fair dealing" as public policy benchmarks in order
to bridle manufacturers' unilateral power." The courts' passive, non-
of the state, particularly regulation of the state's approximately 1200 franchise (new)
and 8,000 independent (used) motor vehicle dealers. It is concluded, further, that the
absence of regulation would have a potential for substantial harm to the public.
1988 SUNSET AND StNDOWN REPORT 23.
5. Balzer, supra note 3, at 697 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 11.61(2)(b) (1987)).
6. Balzer, supra note 3, at 697.
7. Orme, RMA Relevant Market Areas, A Look at State Franchise Law, AUTOMOTIVE
EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1987, at 27, 28 (reports that 49 state legislatures since the 1950s have enacted
laws governing manufacturer/dealer relations).
8. Dealers may have thought of themselves as independent businessmen because dealers
under the franchise system were historically responsible and accountable for significant start-up
and maintenance costs and investments wholly independent of manufacturer assistance.
9. Even today, manufacturers dictate the amount of physical space required for showroom
displays, inventory and repair facilities. The accompanying costs have generated pressure for
many dealers to maintain "dual" franchises in a single location. Accordingly, dealers of domes-
tic models typically also have a franchise for foreign models at the same facility. In Florida, the
investment necessary to form a new dealership for a well-known model, even with savings from a
"dual" arrangement, can easily exceed $5 million.
10. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J.
1135, 1155-56 (1957).
11. See Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
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interference policy eventually proved to be a catalyst for dealers,
through their national association, the National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA), to spearhead the enactment of federal legisla-
tion, culminating in the Dealers' Day in Court Act (DDCA). 12
The DDCA incorporated the requirement of "good faith" into the
relationship between manufacturers and their franchisees, a check per-
ceived by dealers as necessary to ensure fair dealing by manufacturers.
However, this concept was narrowly interpreted by the courts as only
prohibiting the coercion or intimidation of dealers by manufacturers.13
Thus, the dealers' goal of achieving a balancing restraint on the
unbridled vertical power of manufacturers was not attained through
the enactment of the DDCA.
Dealers, through their local associations, such as the Florida Auto-
mobile Dealers Association (FADA),' 4 undertook the task of demon-
strating to their respective state legislatures the need to enact trade
regulations governing the franchise relationship between manufactur-
ers and dealers. 5 Now many states have enacted some form of regula-
tion in this field. Of these, a majority of states have . enacted
provisions that set forth the circumstances under which manufacturers
may install new dealers of the same line-make vehicles in relevant
market areas or territories already designated as the principal trade
area for existing dealers. 16
The Florida regulatory scheme governing the franchise relationship
between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers was motivated by,
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Quarles v. General Motors Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 758 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship
Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It; Automobile Manufacturers, Their
Dealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 483 (1965).
14. FADA is a trade association composed of over 800 franchised motor vehicle dealers
operating in the State of Florida, with headquarters in Orlando. Over the last 18 years, it has
been managed and overseen by David D. Jeffries, its Executive Vice-President.
15. Although Florida has required licensing for manufacturers since 1941, it was not until
1970 that a regulatory scheme focusing on the franchise relationship of manufactures and dealers
was enacted. See ch. 20236, Laws of Fla. 103 (1941) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.61
(1987)); ch. 70-424, 1970 Fla. Laws 826 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 320.60-.70 (1987)).
16. Regulations of this nature are commonly referred to as "entry restrictions" or "RMA"
laws. In Florida, prior to the 1988 amendments, a manufacturer could add a new dealer to an
area served by an existing dealer of the same line-make vehicle by simply demonstrating that the
existing and protesting dealer or dealers had not complied with their franchise agreements or
were not providing adequate representation for the manufacturer in the "community or terri-
tory." FLA. STAT. § 320.642 (1987). For an analysis of this statutory provision in its original
form versus its new configuration, including a "cutting edge" forecast of the "judicial gloss"
likely to be generated by the 1988 amendments, see Haskins & Forehand, New Regulations for
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers and New Protections for their Franchisees, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
763 (1988) [hereinafter Haskins & Forehand].
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and enacted in response to, the Legislature's judgment that there ex-
isted a need to provide a fair and equitable framework to harness the
historically dominant and unchecked vertical power of manufacturers
within the franchise relationship. Florida courts have uniformly recog-
nized that the public policy considerations supporting the enactment
of this trade regulation amply justify the invocation of the state's po-
lice power.1 7 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has clearly rec-
ognized and enunciated the validity of the public policy supporting
this type of trade regulation in the landmark decision of New Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. I" The Supreme Court observed,
"[tihe disparity in bargaining power between automobile manufactur-
ers and their dealers prompted Congress and some 25 States to enact
legislation to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and op-
pressive acts by the manufacturers." 19
Against this backdrop the initial relevant inquiry from the stand-
point of Florida's sunset review process should be whether, absent the
subject trade regulatory scheme, manufacturers would return to their
former pattern of asserting their vertical power to dominate Florida
dealers unfairly. Because the economic disparity that formed the basis
of the previous inequitable practices is inherent in the nature of the
franchise relationship, common sense dictates that the answer will re-
sound in the affirmative for the foreseeable future. Should there be
any lingering doubt regarding the accuracy of this prediction, its cor-
rectness is corroborated by a recent attempt by a manufacturer to cir-
cumvent the franchise protections afforded its dealers in an effort to
return to the "good old days" of unchecked dominance.
In 1987, Chrysler acquired American Motors Corporation. In struc-
turing franchise agreements with the former AMC/Jeep dealers, in-
17. Judicial formulations of the public policy behind particular sections have been ex-
pressed in a series of early cases. See International Harvester Co. v. Calvin, 353 So. 2d 144, 147
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Home Volkswagen, Inc. v. Calvin, 338 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976); Bill Kelley Chevrolet v. Calvin, 322 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Plantation Dat-
sun, Inc. v. Calvin, 275 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
18. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
19. Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted). The Court went on to observe:
In particular, the California Legislature was empowered to subordinate the franchise
rights of automobile manufacturers to the conflicting rights of their franchisees where
necessary to prevent unfair or oppressive trade practices. '[Sitates have power to legis-
late against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal consti-
tutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law .... [Tihe due process clause is
[not] to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a
straitjacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which
they regard as offensive to the public welfare.'
Id. at 107.
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cluding those established in Florida, Chrysler seriously considered the
inclusion of a mandatory binding arbitration provision designed to
eliminate the dealers' ability to gain access to state law remedies and
forums. Chrysler reasoned that application of the doctrine of "pre-
emption" ascribed to the Federal Arbitration Act would serve to de-
prive dealers of their state law remedies.2 0
Chrysler's plans were deferred when states, including Florida, re-
minded the manufacturer that the proposed mandatory arbitration
provisions appeared to be inconsistent with Florida law; such fran-
chise provisions could not be offered to dealers in this state until
Chrysler stated in affidavit form that the proposed franchises would
not be inconsistent with Florida law 1.2 Apparently, Chrysler, to its
credit, could not locate a corporate officer to verify under oath the
absence of inconsistency between such arbitration provisions and
Florida law. This example 22 serves as convincing evidence that the un-
derlying public policy supporting Florida's trade regulation continues
to be justified in today's market setting. Accordingly, it is difficult to
justify the periodic exposure of this trade regulation to the risk of sun-
set repeal simply to afford the Legislature the opportunity to reaffirm
the public purpose supporting it. This is particularly true since the
same public policy that originally warranted the trade regulation when
it was enacted is equally viable today.
Balzer apparently believes that trade regulation in the area of auto-
mobile franchising is no longer desirable. In reaching this conclusion,
however, she does not dispute that there is public policy supporting
the law. Rather, she maintains that the legislative mechanisms devised
to ensure fair play and dealing between manufacturers and dealers
have created burdens for consumers; burdens that she feels far out-
weigh any benefits that may be derived from the regulatory scheme.
Balzer concludes that since this balancing test weighs against the inter-
ests of consumers generally, whatever public policy supported the
trade regulation originally must yield to perceived consumer benefits.
Accordingly, in her view, this trade regulation should have been re-
pealed as a result of the sunset review.
Yet, the express historical purpose and function of trade regulation
is to regulate a particular trade or industry, not to provide consumer
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1978). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 320.63(3) (1987). See also id. § 320.64(19).
22. Another recent example of a manufacturer flexing its muscles occurred in 1984 when
Porsche A.G. notified its American Distributor, Volkswagen of America, that its distributorship
agreement would not be renewed upon its expiration. Fourteen Porsche dealers in Florida were
likewise notified that they would not be franchised dealers for Porsche vehicles under Porsche
A.G.'s direct agency marketing plans.
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protection that may be addressed through consumer legislation if that
protection is deemed necessary or desirable by the Legislature. If par-
amount consideration of consumer benefits is inappropriate when en-
acting trade regulation, it is also inappropriate to apply the public
benefit standard of the sunset law as the acid test of legislative deter-
mination of whether the regulatory scheme remains viable. In sum, it
is senseless to condition the survival of such trade regulation on satis-
faction of the nebulous test of whether consumers receive a greater
measure of benefits from the regulation than the entities and interests
actually regulated by the statute. 23 Nonetheless, it is just this compari-
son that forms the basis of Balzer's critique of the manufacturer-
dealer franchise trade regulation.
The basis for Balzer's critique of the manufacturer-dealer franchise
trade regulation rests principally on two published economic studies
24
and a 1986 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report25 that criticize the
use of "entry restrictions" or "relevant market area (RMA)" laws to
limit the manufacturer's decision to authorize additional dealerships.
A cursory examination of these sources reveals the fatal flaws they
contain. For example, Smith concludes that franchise regulation im-
poses an economic burden on consumers by applying a 1954 price da-
tabase to regulations in effect in 27 states as of 1979. Smith
apparently ignores the fact that at the time the 1972 Census of Retail
Trade was compiled, which he relied upon, only 6 states had laws re-
sembling the type of regulations in effect in the 27 states with such
regulations in 1979. Accordingly, the validity of any conclusion based
thereon is fundamentally questionable.
The 1983 Eckard study is also highly suspect. The apparent data
source for this study is the retail price of 1978 Chevrolet vehicles.
However, the data base arbitrarily excludes data for a car line if the
calculated unit price or cost was greater or less than the national aver-
age by more than 50%. In other words, the data base is somewhat
arbitrarily selective.
23. Indeed, a meaningful scale to weigh and measure the occurrence and accumulation of
such putative consumer benefits or burdens has yet to be patented, much less perfected. For
example, if Porsche A.G. had succeeded in 1984 with its plan to replace the American Porsche
dealerships with local agents and geographical service centers, how would one quantitatively
measure the consumer burdens which would accrue to Florida Porsche owners when their vehi-
cles had to be taken to Atlanta for service instead of to the former conveniently located dealer-
ships.
24. Eckard, The Effects of State Automobile Dealer Entry Regulation on New Car Prices,
24 ECON. INQUIRY 223 (1985); Smith, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State
Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125 (1982).
25. ROGERS, THE EFFECT OF STATE ENTRY REGULATION ON RETAIL AUTOMOBILE MARKETS
(1986) (Bureau of Econ. Staff Report to the FTC).
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The FTC report criticizing state "entry restrictions" or RMA laws
as responsible for increased retail prices is based on the same database
utilized by Eckard. Not only is the FTC methodology flawed from a
theoretical and technical viewpoint,2 6 but General Motors refused to
release the data base or data source used by the FTC when requested
by Wharton incident to its evaluation of the report. General Motors'
refusal to allow other experts to use or even inspect its data pursuant
to a review of the FTC findings and conclusions hardly provides a
ringing endorsement of the opinions contained in the report.27
Even assuming, as does Balzer, that the FTC report is wholly accu-
rate and impeccable in its conclusion, the real weakness of the FTC
report and, to some extent the Smith and Eckard findings, is under-
scored by the teachings of practical experience. For example, with ref-
erence to the states of Florida and Georgia (Georgia does not have an
RMA law) the FTC report dictates that the retail price of a 1985 line-
make vehicle would be at least 6.14076 higher in Florida than the price
of the same vehicle sold at retail in Georgia. Therefore, "high line ' 28
cars retailing at an average price of $30,000 in Georgia would, accord-
ing to the FTC report, cost an additional $1842 in Florida. If such
disparity in prices actually existed in the marketplace, it is doubtful
that any high line vehicles would ever be sold in north Florida since a
short drive across the Georgia line would be financially rewarding. Of
course, the absence of a flood of Florida car shoppers in Georgia to
take advantage of this theoretical pricing differential is a meaningful
fact tending to refute the conclusions of the FTC report.
Finally, Balzer argues that Florida's manufacturer-dealer trade reg-
ulation does not actually provide measurable benefits to Florida fran-
chisees and should have been allowed to sunset. She reasons that since
22 of 24 manufacturers' applications for additional dealers ("new
points") have been approved in the last five years, the entry restric-
tions are essentially ineffective in protecting existing dealers. 29 This
analysis completely ignores the deterrent effect this law has had on
"over dealering" by manufacturers. In fact, the most logical conclu-
sion to be drawn from these statistics is that because of the entry re-
26. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the FTC's
Analysis of the Effects of RMA Laws on Auto Markets (1987) (critique of the FTC study com-
missioned by the National Automobile Dealers' Association).
27. It is no small wonder that ECCA's staff report, which bottomed its conclusions in favor
of sunset repeal largely on this FTC report, was not viewed as gospel by the rank and file legisla-
tive members.
28. Cadillac, Lincoln, Mercedes, BMW, and Porsche, to name a few.
29. This fact, however, tends to negate Balzer's contention that entry restrictions are inher-
ently anticompetitive. Balzer, supra note 3, at 697.
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strictions, manufacturers have largely confined themselves to applying
for new points in areas where additional dealers are actually needed.
On balance, it is indeed a healthy sign that the Legislature, within
the sunset process, continues to affirm the policy underlying the mo-
tor vehicle manufacturer-dealer franchise trade regulation, thus ensur-
ing a course of fair dealing between manufacturers and their Florida
franchisees. It is unfortunate, however, that the current sunset process
demands a periodic review of all trade regulation even if it is obvious
that the basic public policy justifying the enactment of such regulation
remains viable and entrenched. Perhaps Florida should follow the
lead taken by Mississippi, Nebraska and North Carolina and repeal its
sunset law as it relates to trade regulation.30
On the other hand, the demands of predictability and consistency
play a significant role in measuring the responsiveness of any trade
regulation. From this standpoint alone, the manufacturer-dealer law,
as refined by the 1988 amendatory scheme, is better equipped to ad-
dress the concerns and problems springing from the constantly evolv-
ing relationship of dealers and manufacturers. 1 Of course, both the
elements of predictability and consistency should be enhanced as the
amended law is given judicial gloss and interpretation. Therefore, no
one can question that the sunset process was indeed instrumental in
leading to the creation of wide ranging amendments to the regulatory
scheme; amendments which were fashioned as a compromise of the
concerns raised by the regulated industries and which should operate
to enhance the benefits derived from heightened elements of predicta-
bility and consistency. Accordingly, to assay the amended regulatory
scheme, as does Balzer,32 as more restrictive as a result of sunset re-
view and consideration is not meaningful.
The proper analysis should be whether the amended scheme is more
responsive to industry-related problems and issues. Certainly a com-
prehensive review of the responsiveness of the amended trade regula-
tion will be available in 1998. Then, the regulation is again scheduled
to sunset, can be better addressed if in 1998 when the regulation is
again scheduled to sunset, the Legislature remains of the view that all
30. The need for periodic review of the various dimensions and functions of regulatory
agencies is appreciably different from the need to redefine the public policy supporting trade
regulation generally. Sunset review seems ideally suited to provide periodic assessment of agency
function and expansion. In the case of trade regulation, however, the regulated interests can
always be expected to remind the Legislature if the regulation becomes one-sided or is no longer
needed based on policy considerations and fundamental changes thereto.
31. See Haskins & Forehand, supra note 16, for analysis of the many issues addressed by
the 1988 amendments.
32. Balzer, supra note 3, at 697.
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trade regulation should be exposed to sunset review, a comprehensive
review of the responsiveness of the amended trade regulation may be
made and all problems and issues addressed.

